Incentivizing Collaboration in Heterogeneous Teams via Common-Pool Resource Games

Saturday, April 25, 2020 - 11:30am - 12:00pm
Keller 3-180
Vaibhav Srivastava (Michigan State University)
We consider a team of heterogeneous agents that is collectively responsible for servicing and subsequently reviewing a stream of homogeneous tasks. Each agent (autonomous system or human operator) has an associated mean service time and mean review time for servicing and reviewing the tasks, respectively, which are based on their expertise and skill-sets. Agents receive a utility based on the rates at which they service and review the tasks. The team objective is to collaboratively maximize the number of serviced and reviewed tasks. We formulate a Common-Pool Resource (CPR) game and design utility functions to incentivize collaboration among heterogeneous team-members in a decentralized manner. We show that there exists a unique Pure Nash Equilibrium (PNE) for the CPR game. We characterize the structure of this PNE and study the effect of heterogeneity which we characterize by the variation in the ratio of mean review time and mean service time among the agents. We show that the CPR game is a best response potential game for which both sequential best response dynamics and simultaneous best reply dynamics converge to the PNE. Finally, we numerically illustrate different measures of inefficiency for the PNE such as the price of anarchy, ratio of total review admission rate and ratio of latency. This is joint work with Piyush Gupta and Shaunak D. Bopardikar